the intersubjective turn

gunnlaugson, scott, bai, and sarath

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theoretical approaches to contemplative learning and inquiry across disciplines



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Per-(Me-Thou)-ability

Foundations of Intersubjective Experience in Contemplative Education

PATRICIA MORGAN

The sense of permeability or intersubjectivity that can arise in contemplation was described by Angelina, a yoga teacher and theology student at Loyola Marymount University (LMU), Los Angeles, as merging with something larger than herself. What she was interspersed with had "no 'personalness' . . . it's a place that all comes together . . . it's not just flying in all directions" (Interview, 29 October 2009). Further, in speaking of the intersubjectivity in her yoga classes, she described her students being "in sync," and that "it makes [her] happy at the end of class when the *aum* is more resonant . . . sometimes [she doesn't] really know how to control it but [she] just feels that everyone is in sync." Jason, a Sanskrit student and yoga teacher at LMU, spoke of something similar from his yoga classes:

> You can kind of almost read what's happening in that other person if you get sensitized enough? I mean it's a vibe that we can get wrong, but lots of times it's pretty obvious, some people call it *Social Wi-Fi*, have you heard of that? You know just the fact that you tune into what other humans are doing here and you sort of pick up their *buzz* and you come to their level. (Interview, 11 October 2009)

In asking what founds these experiences of "social wi-fi" and group resonance, this chapter presents a phenomenological view of the foundations of intersubjective experience, to provide ontological support for pedagogue/researchers currently working to engage the intersubjective (Churchill, 2012; Guilar, 2006; Ligorio, Talamo, & Pontecorvo, 2005; Matusov, 2001; Murphy & Brown, 2012; Sarath, 2006; Scott, 2014; Wilson McKay, 2009). Understanding the interrelational and elemental foundations of this experience will, I believe, support the development of a pedagogy more congruent with intersubjective experience in education. Primarily, I suggest that there is an equivalence between the interweaving nature of intersubjective experience and its preontological substrate. Feeling this in contemplation is, I suggest, what founds intersubjective experience. My overarching aim is to initiate dialogue regarding this ground, while highlighting the need for ethical reflection when working with individuals as they feel themselves permeating and being permeated by each other and such a fundament.

In this examination of the foundations of intersubjective experience, I start with Martin Heidegger's proposition of a primordial ecological ground (by ecology I reference the bionomic understanding of universal interconnected and interpenetrating systems). I propose that this ecological ground is most directly "felt" through contemplative practice and that this experience facilitates a return to the body, which in turn is required to feel the interrelationality of one's own and others' "bodies." The importance of contemplative somatic awareness in intersubjective experience is examined using Merleau-Ponty's germinal concept of *flesh*. Exposition of this interrelationality then introduces a phenomenological, and ecological ground that founds intersubjective experience. I move from this ontological discussion to address the need for reflection on the ethics of care required when developing and implementing second-person education. The emphasis in intersubjectivity discourse is frequently pedagogical, and the rush to apply a much-needed approach in education has, at times, meant that questions about ethics have been overlooked. However, this is not always the case and I join theorists such as Heesoon Bai (2004), Mark Murphy and Tony Brown (2012), and Sharon Todd (2001) in outlining the need to reflect on ethics before applications.

Comparisons

I don't believe the ontological work I am doing here has been done before, though there are a number of important theorists working with

other philosophical aspects of second-person experience in education. In providing summaries of three philosophical approaches to intersubjectivity, I offer a brief summary of the current concerns in the field, while contrasting the theoretical aims of Gert Biesta, Christian de Quincy, and Olen Gunnlaugson with my own. Starting with Biesta's (1999) seminal research, which aspires to move beyond a humanistic approach to understanding the subject, he begins by asking, Where does the subject come into presence? In answering this question, he suggests moving from a philosophy of consciousness that starts with *cogito ergo sum* (I think therefore I am) to a philosophy of intersubjectivity that acknowledges the co-constitution of individual and "community." Further, he posits that there is no preexisting subject; rather, they "come into presence" in an intersubjective space with others. Unlike my endeavor to articulate the elemental form and processes of intersubjective experience, Biesta's work focuses on the shift from an individual to an intersubjective consciousness in the development of a "new philosophy." However, we both aim to positively impact educational theory.

In his research on consciousness, Christian de Quincy (2000) engages the topic of intersubjectivity to answer the question: "Is consciousness first-person subjective or third-person objective?" He starts by defining what he means by "consciousness" and proceeds in his delineation of three forms of intersubjectivity, which are outlined later in this chapter. He develops an evolutionary perspective through an engagement with Ken Wilber's integral theory and finds that interpersonal consciousness precedes the personal. Even in basic lifeforms or "raw sentience" (worms, atoms), intersubjective interiority is as de Quincy claims "ontologically fundamental." His contention is premised on the suggestion that *relations* need to be taken as ontologically primary, for the notion of an autonomous self or individual is a preliminary stage of an evolutionary trajectory. Important here is his suggestion, drawn from the work of Buber, Mead, Jacques, and Habermas, that "subjectivity is always embedded within a matrix or context of mutually co-creating intersubjectivities" (2000, p. 151). His "evolutionary" approach answers the question he originally posed, though he doesn't propose the dominance of first- or third-person consciousness. Rather, de Quincy focuses on the intersubjective as an elemental ground, which is paramount in an evolutionary path from "personal" to "transpersonal" consciousness. Awareness of a "prior" personal or first-person consciousness is contained in movement along this "path" toward the "emergent" interpersonal and then on to the transpersonal, all of which is founded upon an ontological grounding of "all consciousness" that is intersubjective. De Quincy's evolutionary

concerns differentiate his ontology of intersubjectivity from my own. For despite his suggestion of an intersubjective ground, he doesn't elaborate on its form or processes.

Olen Gunnlaugson (2009) examines four accounts of intersubjective theory to "contribute to second-person dimensions of contemplative education." Like Biesta and de Quincy, he acknowledges the problems associated with dualism inherent in philosophical discourse that has been inherited from Cartesian rationalism. He then proceeds to outline philosophical accounts of intersubjectivity that may ameliorate negative impacts of dualistic thinking in education. Starting with Buber's (1988) conception of the "interhuman," which is based on Buber's contrasting of the "I-thou" relationship with the "I-it" relationship. With the latter consisting of individuals interacting with others as objects to simply fulfill their own desires. Gunnlaugson then juxtaposes Buber's interhuman with the Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh's (2003) "Interbeing,' which is based on the Buddhist theory of *pratitya-samutpada* or "dependent coarising." From this perspective Gunnlaugson explains that we "radically coexist and are fundamentally interrelated with what is 'other'" (2009, p. 31). Returning to de Quincy for a moment, this is similar to his notion of the ontological precedence of intersubjectivity over individual subjectivity, which is analogous with this aspect of Buber's and Thich Nhat Hanh's intersubjective theories; Gunnlaugson acknowledges the similarity of these four theorists' propositions through interbeing or the coconstitution of intersubjective experience. He proposes that Wilber's "intersubjectivity-as-*spirit*" further develops the concept of interbeing by identifying "a deeper undivided formless source of consciousness that our experience of interbeing arises in and out of" (pp. 36–37). Gunnlaugson elaborates Wilber's dimensional theory of intersubjectivity to finalize the theoretical platform that grounds his call to include second-person contemplative practice in education. Emphasizing both the ontological and epistemological aspects of such an approach, he positions second-person contemplative education within the growing discourse on, and applications of, first- and third-person contemplative pedagogy.

The Ground of Intersubjectivity

To start this examination of a foundation of intersubjective experience, I draw from de Quincy's (2000) definition of both a 'strong' and 'radical' intersubjectivity as they illustrate this substrate's interrelational form. De

Quincy differentiates between a standard meaning (Intersubjectivity 1) derived from the Cartesian subject as isolated and independent and a two-part intersubjectivity. This first, Intersubjectivity 2a, retains a sense of individualism, though the discrete interiorities of subjects are interdependently formed by their interactions, whereas the second Intersubjectivity 2b, is a stronger form of intersubjectivity where relationship is ontologically primary. What is important here is de Quincy's progressive delineation of these three Intersubjectivities moving toward the "nonphysical." He starts with Intersubjectivity 1, which relies on an exchange of signals between independent subjects and then the "deeper" Intersubjectivities of 2a and 2b, where, as de Quincy terms it, the "nonphysical" and a prior "matrix of relationships" are present. Both constituent aspects of 2a and 2b are suggestive of the preontological ground detailed later in the chapter. In addition, as de Quincy unfolds the definitions, his emphasis on the "experienced interiority" of 2a and 2b also hints at contemplative access. This contemplative penetration of the internal landscape is possible because of the nonphysical nature of intersubjectivity 2a and 2b. In the weaker Intersubjectivity 2a, the "'inter' in intersubjectivity refers to the mutual structural coupling of *already existing* experiencing subjects, where the interiorities of the participating subjects are interdependently shaped by their interaction" (de Quincy, 2000, p. 139). Then in the more "radical" intersubjectivity 2b, this "process" of cocreativity allows for the "individuated subjects to co-emerge, or co-arise, as a result of a holistic 'field' of relationships" (p. 139). It is the sense of this field-like force, accessed in contemplation, which reveals and possibly directs a "matrix of relationships," that makes this aspect of his model relevant here.

The Interrelational Body

The importance of somatic contemplative awareness in the apprehension of intersubjectivity is emphasized by a range of theorists. Colwyn Trevarthen (2009) describes the significance of rhythmic motor activity in intersubjective transfer, while Sean Esbjörn-Hargens and Michael Zimmerman (2009) introduce a "semiotic niche" or intersubjective space of meaning, which arises through sounds (verbal language) and body language. Olen Gunnlaugson and his colleagues (2014) reference different forms of "sensory and somatic knowing" in second-person or intersubjective pedagogy. In my research, a deepening of somatic awareness began for many of the participants through a contemplative encounter

with their bodies, often described as a "return" to the body. This provided an immersive and integrative experience, which Heather, a yoga student in Los Angeles, described through her yoga practice as "integrating the person that I was and the kinds of things I was attracted to, which were missing each other, [and] yoga somehow helps bring these things together" (Interview, 24 October 2009). Neville, a Sanskrit student at LMU, spoke of his meditation practice allowing him to experience the interrelationality of his "intuitive mind" as opposed to the fragmentation of his "superficial mind":

> It's almost like different pieces are pulled apart and everything gets separated inside, and once everything's separated it's very hard to do anything I find. . . . It's like I can be left with the ability to do some rational thinking, which I don't really find very helpful most of the time because it's not based on intuition . . . it's just that there's more of you when you're in that whole state, when intuition just happens. (Interview, 2 November 2009)

What Neville, Heather, and others found in contemplation was an ecological mind-body, one intimately entwined with a preontological ground, their contemplative contexts and communities of practice.

Merleau-Ponty (1968) provides for these sorts of contemplative interrelational experiences through his flesh ontology. He starts with the suggestion that perception already exists in, and therefore permeates, all that is perceived. What is seen and touched, sees and touches back because "our flesh lines and even envelops all the visible and tangible things with which nevertheless it is surrounded, the world and I are within one another, and there is no anteriority of the *percipere* to the *percipi*" (p. 123). The maturing of perception in the folding over and into of the *perceiving* and *perceived*, or its turning back upon itself in the chiasmic reversibility of perception, occurs because *flesh* allows a "new type of being . . . [a] . . . being by porosity, pregnancy, or generality" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 149). The perception of this being is likened to an "organ of conception" (Kirby 2006, p. 134) in which the immanence of *flesh* bursts forth:

> . . . a sort of dehiscence [which] opens my body in two, and because between my body looked at and my body looking, my body touched and my body touching, there is overlapping or

> encroachment, so that we must say that the things pass into us as well as we into the things. (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 123)

Here Merleau-Ponty develops the inherence of intersubjectivity, as *flesh* is progenitive, immanent and the "formative medium of the subject and object" (Cataldi 1993, p. 60). Its procreative force is caused by a continuous process in which the flesh folds on and over itself, "labouring" on itself, hollowing itself out and coiling over until it creates an "other" side to itself (p. 60).

The deep somatic focus that can lead to feeling our inherent or essential interrelationality is a significant aspect of Heidegger's (1927, 1962) developmental process outlined in *Being and Time*. This process involves our experience as bodily beings and is founded on embodied engagement with the preontological (Levin 1999, p. 135). The "grace" of this form of bodily engagement or attunement (*stimmung*)[1] inherent in preontological being allows us to experience ourselves as "woven into a field or clearing (Merleau-Ponty would speak, here, of "*la chair*," an elemental flesh) that we share with all others" (p. 135). The interrelational force implicit in *stimmung* is suggestive of our ecological form and our apperception of it in contemplation.

The Ground of Intersubjectivity

Our inherent interrelationality outlined in Levin's (1999) account of *stimmung* mirrors a similar form in an elemental ground developed by Heidegger. This ground, I suggest, is necessary to engage de Quincy's "deeper intersubjectivities" (2a and 2b). Heidegger's examination of this elemental foundation began with his reworking of Heraclitus's *logos* and *legein* in his work on articulatory gesture. Levin (1999) introduces Heidegger's translation of these terms beyond the common understanding of *logos*, meaning "word," "speech," "discourse," and *legein*, the corresponding verb "to speak" or "give account." Heidegger suggests a more "primordial" understanding as a *gathering* and *laying down*. The debate proceeding from Heidegger's development of this alternative meaning, which relates to its etymology, provides further clues to its processes and ground. This dispute focuses on what initially appears to be two conflicting meanings, either "gathering" or "stating." In defining the *legein* as "gathering," Stephen Ross (1997) proposes that it is the "gathering of things into their *parousia*, their 'presence' ('*Anwesenheit*') in

the now, the 'present' ('*Gegenwart*'), of the *logos*" (p. 2); whereas George Pattison (2000) describes the *legein* in terms of "stating," for he indicates that the *legein* is etymologically related to the Germanic word "lay." He suggests that this understanding has led to *legein* being known as the "laying out" or "stating" of an issue. These two contrasting definitions are resolved by John Caputo's (1986) classification, which is based on *legein*'s Greek origins. Caputo proposes that *logos* comes from the verb *legein*, "which means, as Heidegger has consistently maintained over the years, 'to collect together,' 'to lay one thing beside another,' 'to arrange one thing after another.' . . . Thus *legein* means to let something lie forth" (1986, p. 78). Therefore, the *legein*[2] gathers together as a means to "state" or "lie forth."

The way that the *legein* lays forth what it has gathered together is important here, because it is indicative of its preontological ground. This is illustrated through the relations of *logos* and *legein*, for while *legein* is to (speak), gather, or lay down, "*Logos* is the original **saying** of **being** that makes language possible . . . it is the original source out of which the gathering process proceeds" (Schalow & Denker, 2010, p. 178, original emphasis). And returning to Levin's examination of motility, the *legein*, as an expression of the *logos*, is a fundamental gathering or laying down process underpinning motility, which is important to remember when questioning the place of the body in contemplative intersubjective experience.

The part that contemplation plays in revealing this ground is outlined by the phenomenologist David Levin (1999) in his critique of Heidegger's project on being and embodiment. He starts with Heidegger's use of the term *befindlichkeit* as the " 'pre-ontological understanding of being,' which attunes and destines our gestural being . . . that is to be found and retrieved by a reflection which parts company with the subjectivity of the *ego-cogito* and its co-emergent object, in order to recollect 'beneath the subject' " (Levin 1999, p. 142). This recollection "beneath the subject" is significant, for it can be read as a form of contemplation that leads to the ground-of-being experience. Heidegger proposes that the preexistence of a *legein* (through the *logos*) is most clearly sensed in a space that he describes as the "between of hearing and speaking" (Ziarek 1994, p. 35). It is a preverbal twilight described by Krzysztof Ziarek as the "hearing that goes toward the *logos*, the hearing that happens within *legein* as *legein* itself" (p. 35). Ziarek's reference to the presence of a foundational space/state, which contains the quality of the perception it underpins, reveals the contradiction of the *legein*

as pre-*hearing*, for the outcome, or the actual "hearing," happens as though against its elemental being. Nevertheless, even though the *legein*'s activities remain irreducible to language, the *legein is still* linked to the material manifestations it underpins, which in this case is contemplative intersubjective experience.

David Kleinberg-Levin (1985) further outlines a refined (contemplative) phenomenological awareness in his proposition that the *legein* is "confirmed by our motility—that if we cultivate a phenomenologically vigilant awareness in our motility, we will eventually encounter the *implicit* (ontological *legein*)" (p. 140). Further, he claims that it is possible through mindful reflection to "realize the thorough-going, on-going 'interaction'—one might even say the 'interpenetration' or 'interweaving'—of the immeasurable Legein of the primordial Logos and the measured legein of our own motility" (p. 142). The integration of these two forms of the *legein* through their fundamental processes are essential aspects of this phenomenological exposition of the elemental forces at work in intersubjective experience. Importantly, our vigilance or deep focus, which can be maintained through somatic contemplative practice, allows us to feel or resonate with the interweaving processes of the *legein* in the interrelational ground of the *logos*. Engaging this primordial interrelationality is then what founds intersubjective experience.

Ethics before Application in Education

Reports of the profound benefits attributed to intersubjective contemplative experience in education have led to the current growth of educational endeavors aimed at realizing them. This has, at times, meant that reflection on the ethical implications of applying this form of contemplative pedagogy has been overlooked. In outlining my position on the need for ethical reflection in these educational endeavors, I return to de Quincy's (2000) three-part definition of intersubjectivity. He emphasizes the primary nature of relationship, claiming that "relata are constituted by their relationships" (p. 140). In his challenge to the "edifice" of conventional philosophy and science based on what he describes as an "ontology of substance," de Quincy acknowledges that intersubjectivity requires a preexisting subject. However, he then references Process and Buddhist Philosophy to highlight their rejection of a preexistent Cartesian subject in favor of an "ontology of process." In these and de Quincy's development of a second-person philosophy, subjectivity exists

as "experienced interiority," but the forms of individual subjectivity, "co-created as perishable centers of experience in the interplay and flux of intersubjective fact, *are* the individual subjects" (p. 141). In addition to supporting his claim that intersubjectivity precedes subjectivity, his depiction of the "perishability" of the place we're taking our students to with contemplative intersubjective pedagogy hints at the need for care and reflection in its development.

Before suggesting possible approaches to an ethics of care, the following descriptions of intersubjectivity emphasize the need for it. In Linda Finlay's (2009) exploration of Husserl's intersubjectivity, she refers to his concerns about the "aesthesiological layer of the other," that is, how we apprehend an "other's" body as one that is "lived." In answering this, Finlay claims via Husserl that inter- or cosubjectivity is prior to the perceptual encounter with an "other"—it is preexistent. In her elaboration of the "art of intersubjectivity" the educational philosopher Heesoon Bai (2004) speaks of intersubjectivity as both the practice of entering into liminality, where the boundaries of self and other dissolve, and as experiencing the world as "the co-emergence of the world-self" (p. 62). The integral second-person theorist Olen Gunnlaugson uses George Pór's depiction of key aspects of the intersubjective space: "There's nothing like the joy, freedom, and deep intimacy of intersubjective space . . . our shared and passionate attention to what wants to come into being didn't diminish, but rather it enhanced our senses, receptivity, deep intuition" (Pór, in Gunnlaugson, 2009, p. 45). Edward Sarath (2006), the contemplative theorist and pedagogue, speaks of his students' noetic experiences in his Creativity and Consciousness class. He explains how they described a "profound sense of knowing, of apprehension of a level of reality in which the perceptual layers that predominate ordinary life are dispelled" (p. 1836), while the art theorist Sara Wilson McKay (2009) speaks of the "vulnerability" inherent in art education that aims for "interconnectedness."

This brief engagement with intersubjectivity, the experiences of which are described as preexistent, liminal, permeable, intimate, noetic, vulnerable and a state where our senses are enhanced, speaks to the profound and fragile nature of the intersubjective in (and outside of) education. Additionally, factions within contemplative science are pointing to potentially negative side effects of the contemplative practices that can act as entry points to the intersubjective. For instance, Perez-de-Albeniz and Holmes (2000) introduce both the positive and adverse effects of meditation. Describing the latter, they name "relaxation-

induced anxiety and panic, paradoxical increases in tension; less motivation in life; boredom; pain; impaired reality testing; confusion and disorientation; feeling 'spaced out'; depression; increased negativity; being more judgmental; and, ironically, feeling addicted to meditation" (p. 52). One has to compare these with the wide-ranging positive impacts of contemplation, which are outlined across two pages of their article and detailed in the forty years of neuroscience, psychology, and meditation research. Nonetheless, an awareness of possible adverse effects of contemplation, including contemplative intersubjective experience, needs to inform our reflections on pedagogical development in this area. This is not denying the need for second-person pedagogy; rather, it is suggestive of a contemplative or reflective first step in its design by "practitioner pedagogues."

Contemplative Intersubjective Pedagogy

An ethics of care in contemplative second-person education starts with the interrelationality of the teacher-student, student-student, student-teacher-context relationships. This may appear to be stating the obvious, but it's not a "cognitive realizing" but *feeling* the "delicate nature of the teaching-learning relationship" (Todd, 2001, p. 421). As a starting point, this references a normative view of ethics in education, or put simply, the teaching of "values," which according to Sharon Todd (2001) can position ethics as "programmatic" with "a set of duties or obligations that if well-enough defined and well-enough followed will produce the ethical behavior desired" (Todd, 2001, p. 436). She provides an alternative when speaking of "bringing more than I contain" to the educational relationship. Here Todd provides through Levinas an understanding of relationship that differs from that "interbeing" described earlier. For Levinas, the origins of relationship start in the realization of "otherness" and of the "chasm" that separates self and other, where "the other is what I myself am not" (Levinas, in Todd, p. 437). Todd claims that teaching and learning can bridge this gap of "otherness" for it is the encounter with what is outside of ourselves that initiates learning. She then outlines how ethical reflection enters the teacher-student relationship, stating that "Levinas . . . suggests that teaching is about staging an encounter with the Other, with something outside the Self, whereas learning is to receive from the Other more than the Self already holds" (p. 437). In recognizing and opening to the "otherness" of the other (teacher or

student), we receive "more than we originally contained" and this is where an ethics can be found. Using Levinas's concept of the "face," as one's essence, Todd indicates how ethics becomes implicit in the educational relationship. She suggests that in relating to the other (student or teacher, as ethics goes both ways), we need to become a "learner" to open our self to the "face-to-face" encounter. The face "is a living presence; it is expression. . . . The face speaks. The manifestation of the face is already discourse" (Levinas, in Todd, p. 349). Therefore, ethics is always a potential *in* the relationship and can become imbued in learning rather than in the application of an external prescription. To be truly open to the face-to-face encounter, we need to regularly practice self-reflection.

Regular contemplative practice can then help us to, as Bai (2004) states, "practice the art of intersubjectivity," an art that also requires contemplative practice, wherein we experience a state of subject-object communion. This is needed to develop and maintain a "preventative ethics" or ethics as an everyday activity rather than "interventional ethics" that is required for instances of wrongdoing, injury, or mistreatment (Bai, 2004). Bai's alternative to interventional ethics necessitates the development of an intersubjective mode of being that is fostered by contemplative practice. In developing preventative ethics, Bai contrasts objectivist perception where the "other" is an object for the subject, or is "other-ized"—with the intersubjective mode—"whereby the subject enters into a liminal space of ambiguity and wonder. . . . [where] the clear and distinct categorical division between the subject and object gives away to the self's movement toward the other, and there emerges a sense of participation in the other's reality" (2004, p. 61). This intersubjective mode, according to Bai, is not an exertion of one's will over another, but as Todd (2001) outlines, the maintenance of an openness to the other.

Remaining open in this way is not passive but rather an active process of "making oneself receptive and susceptible" (Bai, 2004, p. 61). Like Todd, Bai acknowledges the vulnerable nature of this approach in an ethics of intersubjectivity and speaks of an alternative to the egoic mode. Alluding to a compensatory need for contemplative practice in developing and maintaining an ethics of intersubjectivity, Bai introduces the Daoist concept of *wu-wei*—nonaction or nondoing—in which the ego isn't driving action; rather, *wu-wei* is a part of a moment-to-moment awareness (mindfulness). Or, as she terms it, the practitioner is in a "space of effortless resonance" (p. 61). Bai's (2004) introduction to

Daoist thought offers useful suggestions for an ethics of care. The Daoist practice of *wu-wei* offers the example of an ethics woven into practice. First there is an acknowledgment of the virtues of the ego; second, its strength of will and ability to plan are harnessed so that will can be used to commit to practice. The practice may then provide an experience of releasing the ego and opening to an ethics that arises naturally. If the practitioner continues with his or her contemplative practice, be it Daoism or other practices, and regularly "feels" the ethics behind ego, they can develop an intersubjective, participatory perception that is the foundation of Bai's notion of preventative ethics.

Lastly, ethical implications for contemplative intersubjective pedagogy relate to the teachers' "presence" in the classroom. Educator Clifford Mayes (2002) describes this as teachers' "non-doing"—a pedagogical reflective practice that results in student-centred teaching where the teacher embodies and reveals "sheer presence" (p. 710). He suggests this as a form of hospitality that "requires me to be there, with my senses focused on the group at hand, listening rather than thinking about what I'm going to say—observing the students, the texts, and the sensory world of the classroom" (p. 710). Pedagogical experience of this form of contemplation can lead to questions about the ethics of intersubjective experience in education. These ethical considerations are grounded in the empathy and feeling for others that can arise through the vulnerability and intersubjectivity of these states. Mayes (2002) believes it is necessary, when engaging others in these heightened states, to release one's ego, intentionality, and consciousness, something that Sharon Todd (2003) describes as being "in the service of the Other" (p. 52). Todd continues: "[r]esponsibility for the Other, being-for the Other, means that the self is no longer a self-regulating agent but is passively open and exposed" (p. 52). The ethics of such relationships lie in limiting our self-concern, which in turn is regulated by our sensibility, where we "feel" or "sense" the way to respond. This cannot be forced, it relies on the willingness of the individuals involved and emerges out of a "'nonintentional affectivity'; that is, an affectivity that arises spontaneously and conditions responsibility for the Other" (p. 52).[3] What is important here is the "nonintentional" character of this approach to ethics as it requires regular introspection and mindful attention in the educational relationship.

Mayes (2002), Bai (2004), and Todd (2001) introduce what I believe to be the most important ethical consideration in the development of

contemplative intersubjective pedagogy—the "presence" of the teacher and student in the classroom. Although they are only three of many philosophers critiquing educational ethics, I believe they provide a useful introduction here as their approaches are congruent with contemplative intersubjectivity. This is because their alternatives to the "programmatic" approach often found in mainstream education are ones that acknowledge and engage an ethics implicit in the teacher-student relationship. According to Todd (2001), this is the ethics encountered when individuals realize they have received more than they originally contained through the relationship. Similarly, Bai's (2004) "interventional ethics" requires contemplative openness to the other, something Todd, through Levinas, describes as the "face-to-face" encounter. Like Bai and Todd, Mayes (2002) emphasizes the need for reflective practitioners who are better equipped through their regular practice to feel the "nonintentional affectivity" that conditions ethical response. This is not to say that an ethical structure isn't built into pedagogy, but that it needs to be conditioned by the pedagogue's open mindful awareness.

In Conclusion

This chapter suggests that contemplation provides entry to experiences of an ecological body and further to immersion in the interweaving of an elemental substrate. The chapter's phenomenological development of that fundament supports my proposition that a practitioner's interspersion with this interrelational ground is the genesis of intersubjective experience. Contemplation or Heidegger's "reflection beneath the subject" affords entry to experiences of this ground, while his primordial account of *legein*'s interweaving processes at work in the logos provides an understanding of its elemental and interrelational form. This leads to the proposition that if at the most fundamental level we are interrelational and therefore permeable, then it is essential that reflection on ethics is paramount in the design of second-person pedagogy. The three educational philosophers who offer direction for such an ethics emphasize the educator's contemplative "presence." They underscore the need for an everyday "preventative ethics" that arises internally from contemplative presence as opposed to the application of an external prescriptive ethics. In doing so, they stress the need to be awake in the intersubjectivity of the educational relationship.

Notes

1. Levin (1999) describes the way that Heidegger uses *stimmung* as "bodily attunement," though he states that it is "usually translated as 'moodedness' and 'attunement,' but usually given an interpretation that is far removed from a phenomenology of embodiment and sensibility" (p. 131).

2. James Risser (1999) supports Caputo's proposition and introduces the concept of an "essential" or foundational aspect of language, "derived from the verb *legein*, *logos* (in Lat., *legere*, in Ger. *legen*) denotes a laying before, a laying out, a lying there. Heidegger claims that this originary significance of legein illuminates the presupposed essential nature of language" (p. 196).

3. For further reading on the ethics of intersubjective experience in education, see the work of Biesta (1994), Dhawan (2005), Lamberti (2009), Smythe and Murray (2005).

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